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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the theory and recent empirical studies on privatization, with
a special focus on the efforts made in the case of China. Over the last decade,
the Chinese government has initiated major privatizations in an attempt to pro-
mote more efficiency and improve the financial and operating performance of
state-owned enterprises. Despite the great variation in perspectives and adopted
methodology, studies on privatization mainly address the following two ques-
tions: why to privatize and how to privatize? Also, there is a huge literature on
the post-privatization performance of these firms. While privatization has
improved the performance of most SOEs worldwide, our data suggest that it does
not work very well in the case of China.
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Ever since Britain’s Thatcher government launched a large-scale pri-
vatization program in the early 1980s, skepticism about the govern-
ment’s role in allocating resources has spurred worldwide privatiza-
tions, both in developed and in developing countries. By divesting
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at once or selling part of their assets,
governments usually wish to promote more efficiency and improve
SOEs’ financial and operating performance. Despite the great varia-
tion in perspectives and adopted methodology, studies on privatization
mainly address the following two questions: why to privatize and how
to privatize? Also, there is a huge literature on the post-privatization
performance of these firms.
This paper reviews the theory and recent empirical studies on pri-
vatization, with a special focus on the efforts made in the case of
China for the following two reasons. First, China has taken a unique
gradual path in reforming its SOEs, rather than implementing a rapid
market liberalization and mass privatization as seen in some Eastern
European countries. Specifically, the government usually allocates
shares to distinct investors categories, such as institutional investors,
retail investors and foreign investors, while simultaneously it retains
a large stake in most firms at the time of their privatization (‘partial
privatizations’). This policy has resulted in a unique mixed ownership
structure that differs significantly across firms. Second, under the pol-
icy of privatizing all but the largest and strategically important SOEs,
privatization has had a significant impact on the Chinese economic
landscape. By the end of 2003, over 1200 middle- and large-sized
SOEs have been privatized through listing (some of) their shares on
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Furthermore, China’s
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 may further
expedite the pace of privatization in the near future, as domestic firms
will have to compete with foreign ones on an equal basis once the
domestic market is fully opened. Most of this process will be accom-
plished by 2007, i.e. within six years after WTO accession. As an
example, since 2001 the Chinese government has worked out regula-
tions to further facilitate the transfer of state-owned assets and has
established a number of policies loosening foreign ownership restric-
tions.1
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly intro-
duce the reform of state-owned enterprises in China. Section III
648provides some theoretical arguments on the underlying motives for
privatization. Also, we argue that privatization in the case of China
typically is only partial and describe the evolution of ownership as of
privatization for Chinese SOEs. In Section IV, we present the methods
for implementing a privatization program. Section V reviews the
empirical studies that examine the performance of newly privatized
firms. Also, we discuss the results of our own (preliminary) study on
the post-privatization performance of Chinese SOEs. Finally, Section
VI concludes our paper.
II. THE REFORM OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN CHINA
According to Liu and Gao (1999), the reform of SOEs in China has
experienced four stages since the third Plenum of the eleventh Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978. The
first stage (1979-1983) featured administrative decentralization and
profit retention. As part of this restructuring, the management of SOEs
obtained some discretion over the production process whereas firms
were allowed to retain 3% of their profits. Although the reform more
aligned the incentives of managers with those of the government, it
also led to the unexpected decline of government revenues when
managers started bargaining over the profit sharing rules or even hid
profits. To deal with these problems, the government shifted its policy
and required SOEs to pay taxes instead of turning in profits directly.
The second stage of the reform (1983-1987) centered on the role of
bank loans in financing SOEs. SOEs now did no longer obtain fund-
ing directly from the government through budget allocation from
financial reserves, but had to borrow from state-owned banks. This
policy relieved some of the government’s financial burden but inad-
vertently increased the debt ratio of many SOEs. Average leverage
(book value of debt/total assets) of SOEs was as high as 67.9% in
1994 and 65.1% in 1996 (Wu (1997); Sun and Tong (2003)).2 Also,
bad loans at banks rose significantly because a lot of loans were
granted to poorly performing companies, which continued to benefit
from soft budget constraints.
In the third stage of the reform (1987-1992), the government imple-
mented a Contractual Management System. Managers, as a result,
received more freedom in managing the company but also promised
to turn in a beforehand-agreed-on amount of taxes. However, the
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the loss side. In other words, the government continued to assume
most of the responsibilities should there be losses. Not surprisingly,
these reforms were not able to solve the SOEs’ problems of low effi-
ciency and poor financial performance.
The fourth stage of the reform was initiated after the 14th Party Con-
gress in October 1992, targeting the construction of a socialist market
economy and the establishment of a modern corporate system. The
latter refers to restructuring the SOEs into modern corporations with
clearly defined property rights and corresponding ownership structure.
In doing so, the state and the local governments started to “corpora-
tize” many SOEs into limited liability firms. The reform also paved
the road for private and other forms of ownership in SOEs. Also, under
the policy of “seizing the large, releasing the small,” which means
privatizing all but the largest and strategically important SOEs, many
small and weak enterprises have been sold off to employees and other
private investors3 whereas a significant number of medium- and large-
sized SOEs were transformed into publicly listed companies. For this
purpose, the government established two exchanges, the Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in
December 1990 and April 1991, respectively. By the end of 2003,
1287 firms have been listed on these two stock exchanges, most of
them being former SOEs.
III. MOTIVES FOR PRIVATIZATION
Privatization, as the term itself indicates, is the process of changing
state ownership into private ownership. Privatization goals include the
wish to raise revenues for the state, promote wider share ownership,
reduce the government’s interference in the economy, stimulate eco-
nomic efficiency and introduce competition to subject SOEs to mar-
ket discipline (e.g., Price Waterhouse (1989)). These objectives almost
always appear in all privatization programs, even though different
governments have different priorities in achieving them. These dif-
ferences likely may help to explain the variation in privatization methods
used across countries, which are discussed in Section IV of this paper.
Also, as argued by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), these goals
have made share-issuing privatizations fundamentally different from
ordinary IPOs. In this section, we discuss the theoretical arguments on
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zation in the case of China typically is only partial and describe the
evolution of ownership as of privatization for Chinese SOEs.
According to Megginson and Netter (2001), the economic theory on
privatization is the subset of literature on the economics of ownership
and the role of governments in allocating resources. Studies on the
sources of privatization gains thus primarily center on the comparison
between private ownership and state ownership. Different arguments
have been developed from the literature on agency relationships (e.g.,
Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and corporate governance (e.g., Shleifer
and Vishny (1997)).
One important argument is that the real owners of the SOE’s assets,
namely the country’s citizens, are unable to write complete contracts
with the firm due to their diffuse nature. Shleifer (1998) points out that
state ownership fails in motivating managers to innovate, implement
cost reductions and/or improve quality. Also, since governments usu-
ally have social and political goals other than corporate value maxi-
mization, governmental intervention may be detrimental. For instance,
the government may transfer the profits of one (sound) company,
which could be used to finance the firm’s own growth, to help another
(distressed) SOE. And for the concern of social stability, the govern-
ment may require a company to employ more workers than needed.
The entry of private ownership through privatization will make
government intervention in corporate decisions more difficult or even
deter it (Sappington and Stiglitz (1987)).
Other arguments stem from the fundamental theorem of welfare eco-
nomics that efficiency gains can be achieved through competition. State
ownership sometimes deters competition because of the government’s
wish to protect SOEs against bankruptcy. As an example, the govern-
ment can try to save state-owned firms from financial distress by offer-
ing various forms of financing, such as budgetary subsidies, trade credit
via other SOEs with whom the firm trades or loans via state-owned
banks, which weaken the financial disciplining from the capital mar-
ket. These soft budget constraints are considered to be a major impedi-
ment to the competitiveness of many SOEs (e.g., Berglof and Roland
(1998); Frydman et al. (2000); Gao and Shaffer (1998); among others).
Gao and Shaffer (1998) point out that bank financing to poorly per-
forming firms is the main form of soft budget constraints in China.
Hence, it is expected that part of the efficiency gains produced through
privatization will come from reducing soft budget constraints.
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private ownership, staged or partial privatization in which the govern-
ment does not sell its stake in the firm at once is common practice
in China, especially in highly regulated industries (e.g., utilities). As
claimed by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), a staged sale can
increase the government’s revenue because the initial sale reveals the
firm’s (true) value and so fewer shares have to be underpriced. Apart
from the objective to increase revenues, a partial privatization may be
justified for other reasons (see for instance, Sun and Tong (2003); Tian
(2001); Mok and Hui (1998); Perotti (1995)). First, state ownership
can act as a credible signal that the government will commit to its
current privatization policy and will not implement a “re-nationaliza-
tion” in the future. By making itself a main beneficiary of any
improvements in firm value through keeping a large stake in the listed
company, the government implicitly commits itself to not arbitrarily
changing its policy in the future. Second, in countries where the mar-
kets for managerial labor and corporate control are not well developed,
the government may be more efficient in monitoring the firm
than other (small) investors (e.g., Lin (2000)). Third, in a partial pri-
vatization, the government may help firms in terms of policy support
when it owns significantly large cash flow rights in the company (Tian
(2001); Che (2002)).
The issue of partial privatization is quite important when studying
the case of China. Nearly all privatizations of middle- and large-sized
SOEs in China so far are partial ones. Under a socialist ideology, the
government fears that rapid and massive privatizations may lead to the
loss of state-owned assets. As a result, the government assigns priority
to reforming its SOEs into modern corporations through widening
their ownership structure rather than radically changing the nature of
ownership. Bolton (1995), for instance, argues that the strategy of the
Chinese government is to improve its SOEs’ governance structure
rather than fundamentally changing the ownership of production
means. The Chinese government actually believes that attracting new
owners in its SOEs will improve these firms’ corporate governance
and therefore promote their efficiency, even when it continues to con-
trol them. Xu and Wang (1997), for example, point out that in newly
privatized firms, government officials or the SOE’s former managers
usually occupy most board seats. Interestingly, share-issuing privati-
zations (SIPs) mainly occur via primary sales, where new funds are
raised once the firm becomes listed. At that time, the government
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The government ownership percentage then may further decrease
during the years after the SIP when the government chooses to sell its
shares to other institutional investors in a private sale or when the
government takes cash dividends instead of stock dividends.4
Moreover, the ownership structure of a typical publicly listed firm
is rather complicated. Apart from the shares owned by the state, there
are legal persons’shares owned by domestic institutions,5 which, like
the state shares, are non-tradable in the secondary market, and tradable
A shares held by Chinese individuals.6 End 2002, 60% of total
outstanding shares remain non-tradable; state shares represent more
than half of these non-tradable shares. As a result, it is impossible to
obtain a control stake in most privatized SOEs through purchasing
their shares in the secondary market. Not surprisingly, mergers and
acquisitions of Chinese listed firms usually are implemented through
negotiation with the government and/or the institutional investors who
hold large blocks of non-tradable shares.7 Some companies also have
issued employee shares (non-tradable during the lock-up period) and
tradable shares that can only be held by foreign investors, such as
B shares (first issued in 1992), H shares (first issued in 1993) and
N shares. B shares are listed on the two national exchanges, with those
listed on the Shanghai stock exchange denominated in U.S. dollars
whereas those listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange denominated in
Hong Kong dollars. H shares are quoted on the Hong Kong stock
exchange and are denominated in Hong Kong dollars. N shares are
listed on the New York stock exchange and are denominated in U.S.
dollars. By the end of 2003, 111 firms have B shares outstanding and
90 firms have issued H shares. The number of firms listing N shares
on NYSE is quite limited. Interestingly, B shares constantly trade at
a discount compared to A shares (Chen et al. (2001)). Ever since
domestic investors were allowed to also trade B shares (i.e. June
2001), the discount on average amounts to 50%. Before that time, the
discount was even larger as it amounted to 100% or more.8
Table 1 provides some information on the ownership structure of
429 newly privatized firms on the Shanghai stock exchange, based on
data collected from the website of Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Com-
pany Ltd, a Chinese investment banker. In our sample, we include all
non-financial firms with government ownership at the time of privati-
zation. We follow these firms’ ownership structure during each of
the five years subsequent to privatization, with year 0 being the
653privatization year. The table shows that the mean percentage of non-
tradable shares amounts to 69.12% in the privatization year and remains
as high as 60.46% in the fifth year after privatization. The median per-
centage of non-tradable shares reveals a similar picture. These obser-
vations indicate that the market for corporate control hardly exists in
China as it is impossible to take control over a company by launching
a hostile bid in the secondary market. Overall, the decrease in the per-
centage of non-tradable shares over time is due to the fact that firms
issue new (tradable) shares to the public after their IPO. Government
ownership on average represents more than 50% of total shares in the
year of privatization, but the mean percentage of government shares
gradually falls over the years to 37.65% in year 5. Also, as the median
government ownership percentage remains above 50% until year 3, the
Chinese government still controls more than half of all privatized com-
panies two years after privatization. Nevertheless, a standard deviation
of more than 20% in each of the years after privatization shows that
government ownership varies significantly across firms. Next, the mean
and median percentages of legal persons’ shares are constantly on the
rise over the years, to 21.45%, respectively 14.26% in year 5 after pri-
vatization. Moreover, there is a notable upward trend in the percentage
of Ashares. On average, the percentage of Ashares amounts to 35.42%
in year 5, compared to 29.01% in the privatization year; this change is
even more pronounced when examining the median percentage
of A shares. The average percentage of B shares is rather small
(amounting to 1.18% in the privatization year and 2.30% in year 5), but
this is due to the fact that only a limited number of firms have B shares
outstanding. Indeed, when considering only the firms with a positive
number of B shares in our sample (16 firms), we observe that the mean
percentage of B shares is 31.72% in the privatization year, which
slightly increases to 32.72% in year 5 after privatization. Overall, the
figures in Table 1 reveal that even five years after privatization, the
interests of managers in publicly Chinese listed firms remain largely
aligned with those of the government and – to a smaller extent – insti-
tutional investors than with small retail investors.
IV. HOW TO PRIVATIZE?
According to Brada (1996), there are four main privatization methods,
including mass or voucher privatization, privatization from below,
654property reinstitution and the sale of state property. Mass or voucher
privatization enables eligible citizens to bid for the shares in a SOE
or other privatized assets with vouchers that are distributed for free or
at a low cost. So far, this method has only been used in Central and
Eastern Europe. Privatization from below involves setting up new pri-
vate businesses by domestic or foreign entrepreneurs so as to foster
the growth of the private sector. Property reinstitution is the return of
property to its original owners or their heirs. The latter method does
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TABLE 1
Ownership structure according to privatization year of the SOE
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
% non-tradable shares
Mean 0.6912 0.6827 0.6737 0.6344 0.6265 0.6046
Median 0.7001 0.6995 0.6909 0.6475 0.6316 0.6103
Standard deviation 0.0798 0.0776 0.0823 0.0996 0.0998 0.1099
% government shares
Mean 0.5234 0.5019 0.4542 0.4162 0.3954 0.3765
Median 0.5882 0.5700 0.5178 0.4849 0.4563 0.4201
Standard deviation 0.1974 0.2153 0.2366 0.2472 0.2464 0.2347
% legal persons’shares
Mean 0.1322 0.1491 0.1810 0.2028 0.2145 0.2145
Median 0.0490 0.0602 0.0932 0.1108 0.1205 0.1426
Standard deviation 0.1725 0.1903 0.2150 0.2317 0.2379 0.2261
% A shares
Mean 0.2901 0.2962 0.3035 0.3377 0.3406 0.3542
Median 0.2860 0.2920 0.2980 0.3310 0.3310 0.3681
Standard deviation 0.0976 0.0953 0.0978 0.1218 0.1263 0.1392
% B shares
Mean 0.0118 0.0131 0.0152 0.0189 0.0195 0.0230
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Standard deviation 0.0622 0.0649 0.0709 0.0787 0.0796 0.0886
% B shares if positive (N=16)
Mean 0.3172 0.3137 0.3158 0.3158 0.3134 0.3272
Median 0.3193 0.3193 0.3121 0.3121 0.3292 0.3324
Standard deviation 0.0843 0.0814 0.0996 0.0996 0.1001 0.1108
Number of observations 429 383 333 267 241 199not occur much as it is often hard to identify the original owners,
except for the case of real estate. The commonly adopted approach in
most countries, including China, is to sell state property through either
introducing the SOE’s shares on a public capital market (a Share-Issu-
ing Privatization or SIP) or selling the SOE’s assets to a smaller group
of investors, mostly another industrial firm, through a private place-
ment (a direct asset sale).
Recent studies have investigated the terms of privatization, examin-
ing the motives behind and the consequences of using different pri-
vatization methods. These decisions include pricing and share offering
methods and the allocation of shares to non-state investors. An impor-
tant issue in this respect is whether or not foreign investors are allowed
to participate in the privatization program. The latter issue is particu-
larly relevant for some developing countries, including China, that
have greatly benefited from FDI under the form of joint ventures and
green field investments, but still remain cautious about allowing
foreign investors to participate in the privatization of their SOEs.9
Finally, Jones et al. (1999) point out that in implementing a SIP, the
choice of pricing and offering methods and the allocation of shares are
interrelated decisions that governments make in order to satisfy both
economic and political goals.
A. Share-issuing privatization (SIP) versus direct asset sale
Megginson et al. (2000) examine the choice between a SIP and a
direct asset sale using data on 767 public share-issuing privatizations
and 1225 direct asset sales in 92 countries (excluding China). They
argue that the degree of market development, the level of income
inequality, the legal and political environment and firm-specific fac-
tors all influence this choice. In addition to a descriptive analysis, they
also build a logistic regression model to explore the relations between
these factors and the choice of privatization method. Specifically, the
market turnover ratio (total value of the shares traded in the country
each year divided by market capitalization) serves as a proxy for the
degree of capital market development whereas GNP per capita is a
proxy for economic development. Megginson et al. find the proba-
bility of a SIP to be higher in countries with a lower market turnover
ratio, respectively GNP per capita, which they interpret as evidence
that SIPs may intentionally be used to stimulate the development
of (immature) capital markets. The Gini-index, which measures
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of income inequality. Megginson et al. find a negative relation
between this Gini-index and the probability of a SIP, which confirms
their hypothesis that governments have to underprice a SIP more in
countries with higher income inequality in order to get the SOE’s
shares placed, thereby increasing the relative cost of a SIP. Next, they
construct four variables to measure the extent to which private prop-
erty and small shareholders’ interests are protected. These variables
include the Henisz index (measures the ability of the government to
credibly commit to its policy), the property rights index (measures the
degree to which the property rights of private investors are protected
by the country’s laws), the rule of law variable (measures the extent
to which the laws are actually enforced) and the shareholder rights
index (measures legal protection of minority shareholders). Meggin-
son et al. find significantly negative relations between the first three
variables and the probability of a SIP, suggesting that a government
that is able to show strong policy commitment and protects property
rights is more likely to attract buyers in a private asset sale; the share-
holder rights index is not significant in any of the regressions. Finally,
as far as the firm-specific factors are concerned, Megginson et al. use
the log of the offering size, the return on sales (ROS) of the SOE and
a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the firm is in a strate-
gic industry. Their results show that there is a significantly positive
relation between offering size, respectively ROS and the probability
of a SIP. The dummy variable capturing firms in strategic industries
has no impact on the choice of privatization method.
So far, no study has explored the determinants of the choice
between a SIP and a direct asset sale in Chinese privatizations.
Nevertheless, as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) strictly controls the yearly number of firms becoming listed
on the stock market, only relatively profitable firms of large and
medium size are entitled to list their shares, which is consistent with
the findings of Megginson et al. (2000).
B. The pricing and offering method
The pricing and offering method used are essential to the success of
a privatization program, such as whether the program will be accepted
and accomplish the intended objectives. Prior research on this topic
mostly concentrates on the determinants of underpricing (initial return)
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ple, compare the determinants of underpricing in a SIP to those in an
ordinary IPO using data on 630 SIPs from 59 countries, including
China, over the period 1977-1997. They argue that the asymmetric
information problem faced by investors in a SIP is even more serious
than that in an ordinary IPO. Specifically, investors in a SIP are also
largely concerned about whether the government will stick to its policy
in the future. In general, their study is based on the model of Perotti
(1995). Perotti argues that a committed government would first divest
a small portion of its shares at a small discount in order to signal to
the public that it would bear most of the redistribution risk should any
policy changes happen in the future. When the future political uncer-
tainty is high, this committed government should sell a larger fraction,
but with sufficient underpricing to discriminate itself from the
populistic government, which can change its policy easily and cares
more about proceeds maximization. In addition, governments tend to
sell shares at a larger discount when they wish to involve a particular
investor group – e.g., the middle class – in the privatization program
so as to gain wide support for the reform. In subsequent (seasoned)
equity offerings or for politically less important groups, such as insti-
tutional investors and foreign investors,10 governments are more likely
to use bookbuilding or auctions to maximize their proceeds.
From a descriptive analysis of their sample, Jones et al. (1999) con-
clude that offering terms and share allocation in a SIP indeed reflect
the political considerations of governments. Domestic investors and
employees usually enjoy preferential share allocation at fixed and dis-
counted prices. Also, to shed more light on the determinants of under-
pricing in a SIP and to verify Perotti’s hypotheses, Jones et al. build
a simultaneous equations model on a sample of 93 SIPs to explore
the link between initial returns (the difference between the issue price
and the closing price on the first trading day divided by the issue price)
and the percentage of capital divested. Given that the link between
the initial return and the percentage of capital divested may be endoge-
nous, depending on the investors’demand as well as the government’s
supply, they estimate one “demand” and one “supply” equation. Both
regressions take the initial return as the dependent variable and have
some common explanatory variables, including the percentage of
capital divested, an index of economic freedom and the (log) value of
the privatized firm. In the demand equation, they also include the Gini-
index to measure income inequality and a dummy variable that equals
658one when more than 50% of the shares are sold in the SIP (control
transfer). In the supply equation, Jones et al. include government
expenditures and deficit as a percentage of GDP, the percentage of
the offering allocated to foreign investors, respectively employees and
some other control variables, such as dummy variables indicating
whether the SIP is the first privatization in the country, whether it is
an offering in the U.K., etc. Generally speaking, the demand equation
is designed to reflect investor preferences, which are assumed similar
across countries. The supply equation is expected to reveal the dif-
ferent pricing strategies and political considerations across different
types of government.
Jones et al.’s findings are generally consistent with the predictions
of Perotti’s model. Specifically, they find that in the demand equa-
tion, the percentage of capital divested is significantly positively
related to underpricing. So, governments that wish to sell a larger frac-
tion of their shares incur a larger discount. As argued by Perroti
(1995), the willingness of governments to underprice serves as a com-
mitment device to the public. The coefficient of the economic free-
dom index is positive, which shows that investors need to be com-
pensated more if there is a lot of government intervention. Moreover,
the positive relation between the Gini-index and the initial return
implies that higher discounts are required in countries with higher
income inequality (see also Megginson et al. (2000)). The coefficient
of the control transfer dummy variable is significantly negative, indi-
cating that investors need less underpricing if the risk of a future
policy change is smaller. As far as the supply equation is concerned,
the coefficient of the percentage of capital divested is not significant,
probably because pricing strategies are mixed across different types of
governments. The coefficients of the index of economic freedom and
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP are significantly
negative, confirming that populistic governments, that wish to maxi-
mize their proceeds, are reluctant to underprice the issue. Also, the
deficit as a percentage of GDP is used to discriminate between govern-
ments that run on high expenditures because of a deficit and govern-
ments that are really populistic (control variable). Next, the percentage
of shares allocated to either foreign investors or employees does not
affect the initial return, which is contrary to the expectations that
domestic investors are compensated for their smaller allotment of
shares in successful SIPs and that underpricing should be higher to
attract more employees. Interestingly, and unlike in ordinary IPOs,
659the value of the privatized firm, which is used as an inverse proxy for
information asymmetries, has no impact on the magnitude of under-
pricing. In their multivariate analysis on the determinants of under-
pricing, Jones et al. only use data from some developed countries, as
their data on developing countries are not complete. As a result, their
findings cannot be easily extrapolated to developing countries,
including China.
Mok and Hui (1998) examine the determinants of underpricing in
the Chinese market using data on 109 firms over the period 1990-
1993, including 87 A-share IPOs and 22 B-share IPOs. Simultane-
ously, they shed some light on the causes of differential pricing of A
and B shares. First, they claim that domestic investors usually consider
a large government ownership stake after the IPO as a guarantee that
the government will further support the privatized firm. Foreign
investors, however, deem such a large stake as a bad signal as they are
more concerned about the inefficiencies associated with possible state
interventions. Therefore, the higher the percentage of shares kept by
the government, the better the first-day after-market performance (and
thus the perceived underpricing) of A shares, and vice versa for
B shares.11 Second, they claim that information asymmetries are more
serious for domestic investors than for foreign investors, due to the
immaturity of the Chinese stock market. The legal protection of minority
shareholders was so weak, especially during the first few years after
stock markets were established, and domestic investors only had lim-
ited access to company information. By contrast, and in compliance
with international accounting standards, the B-share prospectus con-
tained more elaborate company information for foreign investors.
Consistent with the above arguments, the ex ante risk of the issue,
measured by the amount of new funds raised, has a larger positive
impact on the underpricing of Ashares than on B shares. Also, the time
period between the offering and the listing of shares usually is long
in China, which might further increase the required underpricing by
adding to the ex ante risk of the issue.12 Mok and Hui find a signifi-
cantly positive link between the length of this period and underpricing
for A-share IPOs, while the relation is significantly negative for
B-share IPOs. Furthermore, they find that the cumulative abnormal
returns of underpriced IPOs are negative for an extended period after
the first trading day. This finding could be the result of a fledgling
market, as they argue. Nevertheless, their study suffers from a serious
weakness as they fail to recognize that the magnitude of underpricing
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perceptions. Also, their findings are based on data from the first years
after Chinese stock markets were established and therefore cannot be
easily extrapolated to current years. For instance, the time period
between the offering and listing of A shares has been shortened sub-
stantially and the information disclosure to domestic investors has
been greatly improved.
Chan et al. (2004) is a more recent paper examining the under-
pricing of IPOs in China. Their data set includes all A-share IPOs
from 1993 to 1998 and B-share IPOs from 1995 to 1998. The average
underpricing in their sample amounts to 177.8% for A-share IPOs and
only 11.6% for B-share IPOs. This underpricing is not much lower
after adjusting for market movements. They argue that some institu-
tional factors, including the fairly long time period between share
offering and listing, the control by CSRC on the maximum number of
shares per IPO and the geographic distribution of share issue quotas
by CSRC, and the percentage of non-tradable shares determine the
magnitude of underpricing in Chinese IPOs. As Mok and Hui (1998),
they predict a positive relation between the time period between the
offering and listing of shares on the one hand and underpricing on the
other. They also expect that A-share IPOs show better first-day returns
when the number of shares offered is limited; the reason is that domes-
tic investors have only limited investment opportunities and therefore
are more anxious to buy shares on the first day when only few are
available. Next, as the CSRC installs issue quotas per region, thereby
benefiting firms in relatively under-developed areas to go public, Chan
et al. expect that firms going public in less developed areas will realize
lower first-day returns. Using the number of retail investors in the
area where the listed firm comes from as a proxy for local economic
development, they predict a positive relation between this variable
and underpricing. Finally, consistent with Mok and Hui (1998), they
argue that the percentage of non-tradable shares, i.e. government and
legal persons’shares, has an impact on underpricing. But unlike Mok
and Hui (1998), they predict that even domestic investors consider
this as a signal of inefficiency, and therefore lower first-day returns.
Consistent with their arguments, they find that the underpricing of A-
share IPOs is significantly positively related to the number of days
between offering and listing and the number of investors in the area
of the IPO company, but significantly negatively related to the number
of shares being listed and the percentage of non-tradable shares. The
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these variables. Finally, they also compare the magnitude of under-
pricing before and after 1999, when the CSRC allowed firms and
underwriters to set a range for the offering price instead of using a
fixed price. The underpricing of A-share IPOs has decreased signifi-
cantly ever since, averaging to 107.5%. The latter results are consis-
tent with Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), who point out that using
different pricing strategies can help to reduce underpricing. Moreover,
in order to decrease the underpricing while accommodating the target
group, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) stress that it might be optimal
to split the offering into multiple tranches aimed at different investor
groups using a different pricing strategy. For instance, the total offering
can be divided into an institutional tranche that is marketed using
bookbuilding or auction methods and a retail tranche that is sold at a
fixed price. Chan et al. (2004), however, do not examine this issue.
C. Share allocation to domestic versus foreign investors
In 2002, the Chinese government released two important rules
allowing foreign investors to participate in the takeovers of and
mergers with Chinese listed firms on the one hand and to buy non-
tradable state-owned and legal persons’ shares of listed SOEs on the
other hand. These shares can be sold through an auction, but will
remain non-tradable in the secondary market. These activities,
however, are still subject to the Foreign Investment Guidance, which
stipulates the industries that welcome foreign capital, the industries
where a Chinese partner must hold a controlling stake and the
industries that are barred from foreign investment. This raises
questions regarding the motivation(s) and the consequences of selling
shares to foreign investors in Chinese firms.
Bortolotti et al. (2000) examine why governments may want to sell
shares to foreign investors through listing abroad or cross-listing the
shares in newly privatized firms by examining 392 SIPs in 42 coun-
tries over the period 1977-2000. Unfortunately, as they exclude tran-
sition and socialist economies, their sample does not cover China.
They find that governments are more likely to list abroad the shares
of firms in industries exposed to global competition (e.g., telecom
firms) in order to subject them to the discipline of international capi-
tal markets. Also, governments use listing abroad and cross-listing as
a way to promote trade with foreign countries. Governments in
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and investor-protection oriented to obtain a better price for their
shares. Also, the fact of being listed on such a market itself adds to
the reputation of the firm.
The existing literature on China does not elaborate on why the
Chinese government may want to sell shares to foreign investors,
except that it may wish to attract foreign capital to finance and restruc-
ture its SOEs. But according to the results of some studies, which are
discussed in Section V of this paper, foreign investors do not have an
influence on the performance of Chinese listed firms. Qi et al. (2000)
and Sun and Tong (2003) attribute this to foreign investors owning
only a minority stake in newly privatized SOEs, at least when com-
pared to the ownership percentage held by the state and institutional
investors. Also, foreign investors usually are of diffuse nature and do
not hold enough board seats to influence the firm’s strategy. Their
influence, however, may increase in the future, now that foreign
ownership restrictions have been loosened.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE PERFORMANCE
OF NEWLY PRIVATIZED FIRMS
When launching a privatization program, governments usually expect
it to improve the SOEs’ financial and operating performance. There-
fore, the finance literature has paid a great deal of attention to the
question whether privatization indeed accomplishes these goals. In this
section, we briefly review the empirical studies that examine the finan-
cial and operating changes at the firm level. Two representative papers
are Megginson et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998). Both
studies employ a large multi-country and multi-industry database,
thereby overcoming the small-sample selection bias of earlier studies
(e.g., Pryke (1982); Yarrow (1986)). Thereafter, we discuss studies
that examine the post-privatization performance of Chinese SOEs.
Table 2 summarizes the empirical findings. We end this section by
discussing the results of our own (preliminary) study on the post-
privatization performance of recent Chinese SOEs.
Megginson et al. (1994) compare the pre- and post-privatization
performance of 61 firms from 18 countries and 32 industries that expe-
rience full or partial privatization during the period 1961-1990. They
conjecture that privatization has a positive impact on profitability,
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on financial leverage and employment. To test their predictions, they
compute firm-level proxy variables for a period of three years before
until three years after privatization. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
and proportion test, they find that profitability (measured as return on
sales and return on assets), operating efficiency (real sales per
employee, net income per employee) and capital investment spending
(capital expenditures divided by sales, respectively total assets)
increase significantly both in economic and statistical terms after pri-
vatization whereas financial leverage (total debt to total assets)
decreases. Nevertheless, contrary to the expectation that privatization
leads to massive job losses, they find that in 64% of the newly priva-
tized firms, employment actually increases over the studied window.
Also, they conclude that especially the firms that experience the largest
changes in ownership structure (i.e. the government divests more than
50% of its shares) exhibit the biggest performance improvements.
Taking into account the differences between developing and
developed countries, such as the extent to which capital markets are
developed, differences in GDP, development status of the private
sector, which all can affect the success of a privatization program,
Boubakri and Cosset (1998) extend the study of Megginson et al.
(1994) by focusing exclusively on privatization in developing
countries. Their sample covers 79 firms from 21 developing countries
– unfortunately, China is not included – over the period 1980-1992.
Using a similar methodology as in Megginson et al. (1994) based on
accounting performance measures,13 they conclude that privatization
in developing countries also significantly increases profitability, oper-
ating efficiency and capital investment spending. The decline in the
leverage ratio, however, is only significant when using the unadjusted
measure (and including those firms experiencing a pre-privatization
debt restructuring).
Chen et al. (2002) is among the first studies that investigate Chinese
privatizations using the same univariate methodology as Megginson
et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998). Their database includes
financial statements data (sales, profits, total assets, total debt, long-
term debt, shareholder’s equity and capital expenditures) and owner-
ship information on 735 privatized firms listed on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period 1991-1997. Surprisingly,
the authors conclude that although capital expenditures increase and
leverage decreases after privatization, the performance of Chinese
664SOEs actually deteriorates within three years after privatization. They
attribute this performance deterioration rarely seen in other countries
to the fact that the government still holds a large stake in most of the
companies after their privatization. They link their results to owner-
ship structure by implementing univariate comparisons of subsamples,
split on the basis of the percentage of shares held by the state, legal
persons, respectively domestic retail investors and on the presence of
foreign owners. In addition, they implement a multivariate analysis to
examine the determinants of performance changes, changes in invest-
ment spending and debt ratios. Specifically, they regress changes in
these variables on the percentage change in GNP, the percentage of
shares held by the state, institutional and retail investors after privati-
zation, a dummy variable for foreign ownership and some control vari-
ables including firm size, a dummy for the exchange and industry
dummy variables. They find weak evidence that state ownership
negatively impacts performance and capital expenditures whereas
foreign ownership increases capital expenditures, but reduces leverage.
However, they find no relation between the other owner categories
(legal persons and domestic individuals) and performance.
Ahighly related paper is that of Xu and Wang (1997), who examine
the effects of ownership concentration and ownership structure on
the value and performance of Chinese listed firms during 1993-1995.
Xu and Wang regress the firm’s market-to-book ratio, return on equity,
respectively return on sales on ownership concentration (the owner-
ship percentage and the Herfindahl index14 of the ten most important
shareholders) and ownership mix (the fraction of shares held by the
state, legal persons and small domestic investors). They report a
positive relation between ownership concentration and corporate
value, respectively profitability. Also, from examining the link
between the various ownership types and value, respectively perfor-
mance in more detail, Xu and Wang conclude that legal persons’
ownership positively affects whereas state ownership negatively
affects value and profitability. The percentage of shares held by small
domestic investors does not have an impact on return on equity or
return on sales, but is significantly negatively related to firm value.
The regression approach of Xu and Wang (1997) has been widely
adopted in subsequent studies, which differ in sample and empirical
proxies used to measure financial and operating performance. These
papers also explore the role of foreign investors, via the B share-
holdings. Qi et al. (2000), for instance, expand the sample to Chinese
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(1997), they find that legal persons positively affect performance
whereas state ownership has a detrimental impact. Domestic investors
and foreign investors have no influence. The authors argue that legal
persons hold large blocks of shares and therefore have both the incen-
tives and the expertise to monitor firm management. Conversely,
small domestic and foreign shareholders are of diffuse nature and
therefore lack the incentives and capability of monitoring. These
explanations are consistent with arguments from the corporate gover-
nance literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1980); Shleifer and Vishny
(1986)). Tian (2001) is the only paper up till now that lends some sup-
port to the argument that state ownership may actually be beneficial
to the firm as he discovers a quadratic relation between state owner-
ship and performance. Specifically, when the government’s cash flow
rights are relatively small, the incentives of fulfilling some social
objectives at the expense of value maximization are higher. However,
when these cash flow rights are sufficiently large, firms perform
better, indicating that the government may have more incentives to
monitor the firm and/or help it. Also, what is distinct about this study
is that Tian is the first to recognize that privatization is an endoge-
nous process that may affect the conclusions of studies on post-
privatization performance. As an example, the negative relation
between state ownership and performance might be spurious when the
government tends to keep more shares in poorly performing SOEs.
Therefore, he regresses the change in government ownership at SIP-
time on the firm’s previous-year ROAand industry-level control vari-
ables, but finds no evidence that government divestment is related to
firm profitability.
Sun and Tong (2003) is another notable exception that recog-
nizes the endogeneity problem; their sample includes 634 privatized
(listed) firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the
period 1994-1998.15 They find that although real sales, earnings and
employee productivity improve up to three years after privatization,
profitability (return on sales, earnings on sales) actually declines.
Overall, the performance of Chinese privatized firms is not as good
as would be expected from the experience of other countries, which
confirms the findings of Chen et al. (2002). Also, their findings largely
confirm the positive effect of legal persons’ ownership and the nega-
tive effect of state ownership on firm value and performance. Further-
more, they document a positive relation between foreign ownership
666and firm market value while they find no relation with operating per-
formance. Finally, Sun and Tong check for the possibility that the
profitability of the SOE before privatization might have an impact on
the number of shares the government retains after privatization. For
this purpose, they implement a cross-sectional regression analysis to
examine whether accounting profitability (the three-year average
accounting profits before privatization) affects the government’s deci-
sion of how much shares to retain. The latter variable is measured by
two proxies: the proportion of state ownership upon public listing and
the three-year average of state ownership after listing. However, they
find no relation between the two examined variables, meaning that
they are unable to (partly) model the endogeneity of the privatization
process. Also, in a logistic regression model that estimates the likeli-
hood of selling shares to foreign investors, they find no relation
between accounting profitability and the dependent variable.
The final section of this paper will shed a more recent and more
rigorous light on how privatization impacts on the performance of SOEs
in China. Also, we extend the window to five years after privatization
whereas previous studies limited their observation period to three
years. For this purpose, we use data on a sample of listed firms on the
Shanghai stock exchange over the period 1994-2002. Only non-finan-
cial firms where the government owns a stake at the time of the SIP
are included in our sample. As many firms are restructured before
going public – e.g., their unproductive parts are spun off – comparing
the pre- and post-privatization performance of a sample that still
includes these firms is not so meaningful. To reduce this problem, we
calculate the growth rate in total assets from one year before to the
year of privatization, and drop the firms with extreme growth rates;
using the 5% and 95% percentile value turned out to be sufficient for
this purpose. Next, to reduce the impact of extreme values on our
results, we winsorize all accounting ratios at the 5%-95% percentile.
The performance ratios we examine include return on sales (net
income/sales), return on assets (net income/total assets) and return
on equity (net income/book value of equity). In addition, we inves-
tigate leverage (book value of debt/total assets), financial debt/total
debt, short-term (<1 year) debt/total debt, fixed assets/total assets,
capital expenditures/total assets, inventories/total assets and cash and
marketable securities/total assets. Unfortunately, we are not able to
examine the ratios real sales/employees and net income/employees





Summary of empirical studies on the performance of newly privatized companies
Study Sample description, study period,  Summary of empirical findings
and methodology
Megginson et al. (1994)
Boubakri and Cosset (1998)
Chen et al. (2002)
They conduct a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and
proportion test on accounting measures of 61 pri-
vatized firms during the period 1961-1990 to
examine the financial and operating performance
changes of these firms three years before to three
years after privatization. Chinese firms are not
included.
They conduct a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and
proprotion test on crude and adjusted accounting
measures of 79 privatized firms from 21 develo-
ping countries during the period 1980-1992 to
examine the financial and operating performance
changes of these firms three years before to three
years after privatization. Chinese firms are not
included.
They implement both a univariate and multiva-
riate analysis on financial data (profits, sales,
total assets, capital expenditures, total debt, long-
term debt, shareholders’ equity, and share
ownership) of 735 privatized firms listed on the
two major Chinese stock markets over the period
1991-1997 to examine the performance changes
as well as their determinants.
Profitability, operating efficiency and capital invest-
ment spending rise significantly after privatization.
The leverage ratio declines. Employment increases
in 64% of the privatized firms. Also, firms expe-
riencing large changes in their ownership structure
display larger improvements in their performance.
Profitability, operating efficiency and capital invest-
ment spending, dividends and employment rise sig-
nificantly after privatization, using both crude and
market condition adjusted measures. The leverage
ratio decline is only significant when the effect of
pre-privatization debt restructurings is not accoun-
ted for.
Both the operating and financial performance dete-
riorate after the privatization. There is weak evi-
dence that state ownership negatively impacts per-
formance and capital expenditures whereas foreign
ownership increases capital expenditures but redu-
ces the debt ratio. There is no relation between the
other owner categories, including legal persons and
retail investors, and performance.6
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Study Sample description, study period,  Summary of empirical findings
and methodology
Xu and Wang (1997)
Qi et al. (2000)
Tian (2001)
They regress firm performance measures on
ownership measures of Chinese listed firms
during the period 1995-1995.
They take the same regression approach as Xu
and Wang (1997) on Chinese listed firms over
the period 1991-1996 to explore the relation
between ownership and performance
He uses a similar regression approach as Xu and
Wang (1997) on the performance data of 826
Chinese listed firms to examine the role of state
ownership.
There is a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and corporate value and  profitability.
Also, value and profitability are positively related to
legal persons’ownership, negatively related to state
ownership. Ownership by retail investors is not
related to profitability, but is significantly negati-
vely related to firm value.
The ownership of legal persons positively affects
whereas state ownership negatively affects firm per-
formance. Domestic investors and foreign investors
have no impact on performance.
There is a quadratic relation between state owners-
hip and firm performance. When the government’s
cash flow rights are relatively small, the rent
expropriation effect dominates. However, when
cash flow rights become sufficiently large, perfor-
mance improves, indicating that the government
may have more incentives to monitor or help the
SOE. There is no evidence that the change in gover-
nment ownership is related to the SOE’s prior pro-
fitability.6
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0 Study Sample description, study period,  Summary of empirical findings
and methodology
Sun and Tong (2003) They implement both a univariate analysis and
multivariate analysis on accounting measures of
634 Chinese listed firms after 1994 to examine
the performance changes as well as the impact
of ownership. Also, there is cross sectional
analysis to explore the impact of government’s
decision on the observed performance changes. 
Earnings, real sales and employee productivity
improve up to three years after privatization, but
the return on sales and earnings on sales actually
decline. Also, legal persons positively influence
whereas state ownership negatively impacts firm
value and performance. Foreign ownership has no
impact on operating performance, but has a posi-
tive impact on market value. Finally, there is no
relation between pre- privatization accounting
measures and the government’s percentage of sha-
res kept, respectively the decision to involve foreig-
ners in the firm’s ownership structure.Cosset (1998) – since data on the number of employees are not
available.
The results in Table 3 suggest that the post-privatization perfor-
mance of (partially) privatized Chinese SOEs deteriorates, which is
consistent with the conclusions from earlier studies on Chinese pri-
vatizations. All profitability ratios decline significantly from the year
before to five years after privatization, with mean ROS dropping from
13.09% to 7.57%, mean ROA from 8.53% to 3.16% and mean ROE
from 20.28% to 7.24%. As profitability before privatization is largely
stable over time, it can be concluded that the decrease as of privati-
zation is driven by the event we study. As Chinese SOEs usually raise
new equity at privatization time, ROA and ROE may be negatively
affected (when new funds are not instantly invested or do not pay off
immediately); however, as ROS also decreases and as ROA and ROE
decrease during each of the post-privatization years, we can safely
decide that our conclusions on privatization negatively affecting per-
formance are not spurious.
The mean leverage declines slightly in the years before privatiza-
tion, but plummets from 55.65% in the year before to 39.03% in the
year of privatization. This decline is even more pronounced for the
median debt ratio. After the event, mean and median leverage start to
rise again during each of the studied years and reach 49.74%, respec-
tively 49.67% in the fifth year after privatization. The latter results
contrast with the findings of Chen et al. (2002), who find that debt
ratios of Chinese SOEs decrease after privatization during the period
1991-1997. The trend in the fraction of financial debt (bank loans)16
relative to total debt is less clear-cut. On average, this ratio is increasing
over the years – from 46.10% in the third year before to 52.44% in
the fifth year after privatization – but this trend is clearly disrupted in
the privatization year. Perhaps, access to bank loans becomes easier
after privatization as stock market listing allows firms to strengthen
their equity base. Finally, the mean and median percentage of short-
term debt to total debt increase at the event of privatization and these
patterns are even continued during the next five years. The ratio of
short-term to total debt is extremely high over the years, averaging
77.86% in the year before and 82.32% five years after privatization.
Finally, the asset side of the balance sheet reveals that the average
percentage of fixed assets to total assets drops significantly at priva-
tization, from 39.83% to 33.00%; this drop is even more obvious when
examining the median percentage. In the years afterwards, firms build
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expenditures, we see that investment percentages do not vary greatly
from year to year (even though the percentage is somewhat lower five
years after privatization). This result likely indicates that the large
decrease in fixed assets at privatization is due to firms raising equity
while not immediately investing all funds at SIP-time. Finally,
we observe that the event of privatization increases the efficiency of
inventory management: at the time of privatization, inventories on
average decrease from 17.35% to 12.55% of total assets and firms
more or less stick to this percentage during subsequent years. Cash and
marketable securities increase significantly at the event of privatiza-
tion, from 9.86% to 23.47%, but cash holdings seem to be cut down
during each of the years afterwards.
We now report and discuss the results from a multivariate analysis
on post-privatization performance using the above sample in order to
explore the driving forces behind performance deterioration in
Chinese privatized SOEs. In this analysis, we are particularly
interested in how different types of ownership affect post-privatization
performance. Unlike previous studies, we condition our analysis on
the number of years after privatization. For this purpose, we examine
ROS in Table 4, considering both the determinants of the absolute
ratio in a particular post-privatization year and the determinants of
its change as of privatization. We also report results for ROA(Table 5)
and ROE (Table 6), but as the firm’s financing decisions may influ-
ence these ratios (e.g., the decision to issue seasoned equity enlarges
total assets and equity), we do not largely focus on these performance
measures.17 The model for every year after privatization looks as
follows:
PRt = αt + β1 state + β2 Ashare + β3 foreign + β4 size + β5 leverage +
β6 findebt +β7 shortdebt + β8 fixassets + β9 cash + β10 regulated +
β9 GDP + et;
∆PRt = αt +  β1 ∆state + β2 ∆Ashare + β3 foreign + β4 size + 
β5 ∆leverage + β6 ∆findebt + β7 ∆shortdebt + β8 ∆fixassets +
β9 ∆cash + β10 regulated + β9 GDP + et
where PR indicates the performance ratio, state is the government
ownership percentage,18 Ashare is the retail ownership percentage,
foreign is a dummy for the presence of a foreign owner (foreign
founder or tradable B, H shareholder), size is the natural logarithm of





Descriptive statistics on performance, financial and asset structure for 429 Chinese SOEs at the event of privatization (year 0).
Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Return on sales
Mean 0.1273 0.1328 0.1309 0.1385 0.1352 0.1162 0.1003 0.0898 0.0757
Median 0.1003 0.1087 0.1116 0.1146 0.1072 0.0899 0.0774 0.0666 0.0509
Standard deviation 0.0914 0.0901 0.0853 0.0934 0.1055 0.0978 0.0912 0.0920 0.0804
Number of observations 267 290 360 388 346 306 242 217 179
Return on assets
Mean 0.0818 0.0862 0.0853 0.0616 0.0604 0.0490 0.0428 0.0367 0.0316
Median 0.0742 0.0808 0.0825 0.0588 0.0594 0.0461 0.0397 0.0358 0.0286
Standard deviation 0.0424 0.0383 0.0372 0.0308 0.0370 0.0343 0.0348 0.0320 0.0313
Number of observations 240 282 357 389 348 308 244 217 181
Return on equity
Mean 0.2094 0.2145 0.2028 0.1026 0.1056 0.0864 0.0772 0.0764 0.0724
Median 0.1934 0.2001 0.1985 0.1008 0.1023 0.0832 0.0763 0.0713 0.0624
Standard deviation 0.0989 0.0888 0.0875 0.0518 0.0647 0.0578 0.0564 0.0639 0.0730
Number of observations 237 279 355 389 348 308 244 217 181
Leverage
Mean 0.5991 0.5877 0.5565 0.3903 0.4198 0.4338 0.4507 0.4729 0.4974
Median 0.6296 0.6223 0.5861 0.3796 0.4162 0.4233 0.4521 0.4699 0.4967
Standard deviation 0.1383 0.1345 0.1361 0.1399 0.1505 0.1555 0.1615 0.1720 0.1723
Number of observations 241 322 376 390 348 308 244 217 1816
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4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Financial debt/total debt
Mean 0.4610 0.4702 0.4874 0.4693 0.4703 0.4923 0.5145 0.5002 0.5244
Median 0.4800 0.4969 0.5227 0.5073 0.4969 0.5231 0.5401 0.5365 0.5665
Standard deviation 0.2345 0.2262 0.2237 0.2285 0.2243 0.2255 0.2195 0.2151 0.2130
Number of observations 242 323 378 390 348 308 244 217 181
Short-term debt/total debt
Mean 0.7780 0.7775 0.7786 0.7946 0.8098 0.8185 0.8191 0.8314 0.8232
Median 0.8247 0.8232 0.8085 0.8356 0.8625 0.8714 0.8803 0.8852 0.8823
Standard deviation 0.1995 0.1932 0.1880 0.1829 0.1818 0.1804 0.1876 0.1819 0.1841
Number of observations 242 323 378 390 348 308 244 217 181
Fixed assets/total assets
Mean 0.4035 0.3974 0.3983 0.3300 0.3651 0.3827 0.3759 0.3707 0.3714
Median 0.3916 0.3768 0.3866 0.2985 0.3457 0.3742 0.3565 0.3506 0.3410
Standard deviation 0.1874 0.1828 0.1794 0.1700 0.1669 0.1751 0.1707 0.1802 0.1894
Number of observations 241 322 376 390 348 308 244 217 181
Capital exp./total assets
Mean 0.0778 0.0816 0.0745 0.0771 0.0842 0.0627 0.0607 0.0620
Median 0.0420 0.0477 0.0365 0.0489 0.0565 0.0337 0.0313 0.0253
Standard deviation 0.0896 0.0877 0.0892 0.0858 0.0884 0.0789 0.0798 0.0888
Number of observations 241 321 377 344 307 243 216 1796
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Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Inventories/total assets
Mean 0.1847 0.1834 0.1735 0.1255 0.1341 0.1299 0.1330 0.1338 0.1342
Median 0.1770 0.1693 0.1657 0.1164 0.1239 0.1173 0.1181 0.1175 0.1145
Standard deviation 0.1188 0.1146 0.1122 0.0887 0.0901 0.0915 0.0919 0.0969 0.0994
Number of observations 241 322 376 390 348 308 244 217 181
Cash & securities/tot. assets
Mean 0.0730 0.0882 0.0986 0.2347 0.1686 0.1496 0.1426 0.1457 0.1499
Median 0.0528 0.0590 0.0696 0.2329 0.1481 0.1256 0.1171 0.1183 0.1307
Standard deviation 0.0686 0.0861 0.0885 0.1323 0.1119 0.1050 0.1010 0.1033 0.1054




Regression results for ROS
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel A: Determinants of ROS
Intercept 0.3134 0.0418  0.1698 0.2486  0.1001 0.5084 –0.0354 0.8261  –0.0950 0.6045 
% government shares –0.0083  0.7229  0.0137  0.5078  0.0089  0.6674  –0.0242  0.2651  –0.0035  0.8945 
% A shares –0.0499  0.4521  –0.0228  0.7164  –0.0251  0.6251  –0.0663  0.2138  –0.0886  0.1059 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0240  0.2303  –0.0397  0.0373  –0.0403  0.0440  –0.0468  0.0222  –0.0333  0.1279 
Firm size 0.0012  0.8441  0.0071  0.2663  0.0075  0.2767  0.0110  0.0959  0.0100  0.1542 
Leverage –0.3467 0.0000 –0.3097 0.0000 –0.2444 0.0000 –0.2337 0.0000  –0.1444 0.0002 
Financial debt/total debt –0.0095  0.7133  –0.0217  0.3859  0.0128  0.6198  0.0390  0.1596  0.0013  0.9671 
Short-term debt/total debt –0.1053  0.0014  –0.1269  0.0002  –0.1182  0.0005  –0.1057  0.0054  –0.0556  0.1899 
Fixed assets/total assets –0.0024  0.9448  0.0132  0.7002  –0.0029  0.9327  0.0381  0.3012  0.0266  0.5195 
Cash & securities/total assets 0.0082  0.8678  0.0519  0.2980  0.1579  0.0049  0.1407  0.0089  0.0694  0.2796 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.1132  0.0000  0.0928  0.0000  0.0908  0.0003  0.0917  0.0002  0.0528  0.0688 
Real GDP growth rate 0.6986  0.3256  0.5233  0.3380  0.3936  0.4453  1.0411  0.0303  1.4483  0.1829 
Adjusted R-square 0.3284 0.3396 0.3400 0.3722 0.1586
Number of observations 341 301 237 215 1786
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel B: Determinants of change in ROS
Intercept –0.1410 0.0804  0.0475 0.6070 –0.0984 0.3610  0.0649 0.5496  0.0188 0.9110 
Ch. % government shares 0.0590  0.0267  0.0599  0.0229  0.0190  0.5702  0.0560  0.3155  –0.1293  0.1884 
Ch. % A shares 0.0126  0.9005  –0.1759  0.2121  –0.0212  0.7022  –0.0926  0.5591  –0.1479  0.3039 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0080  0.4725  –0.0038  0.7731  0.0024  0.8650  –0.0021  0.8755  0.0165  0.3326 
Firm size 0.0050  0.1700  –0.0017  0.6961  0.0029  0.5791  –0.0052  0.2881  –0.0016  0.8113 
Ch. leverage –0.0573  0.1199  –0.1202  0.0042  –0.1454  0.0016  –0.0629  0.1595  –0.1822  0.0046 
Ch. financial debt/total debt –0.0088  0.6680  –0.0055  0.8199  –0.0533  0.0670  –0.0169  0.5672  0.0021  0.9592 
Ch. short-term debt/total debt –0.0209  0.4104  0.0241  0.4779  0.0738  0.0741  –0.0475  0.2123  –0.0717  0.1732 
Ch. fixed assets/total assets –0.0491  0.2385  –0.0206  0.6657  –0.0250  0.6777  0.0507  0.3146  0.1069  0.1729 
Ch. cash & securities/total assets –0.0339  0.3835  0.1294  0.0053  0.0558  0.2996  0.1086  0.0207  0.0725  0.3372 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.0160  0.2464  –0.0281  0.1007  0.0064  0.7496  0.0045  0.8097  –0.0443  0.0970 
Real GDP growth rate 0.5127  0.2553  –0.4231  0.3303  0.3221  0.4571  0.4837  0.1960  0.0377  0.9739 
Adjusted R-square 0.0096 0.0789 0.0858 0.0325 0.0729




Regression results for ROA
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel A: Determinants of ROA
Intercept 0.1687 0.0034  0.0200 0.7108  0.0034 0.9574 –0.1591 0.0073  –0.0669 0.3297 
% government shares –0.0047  0.5868  0.0068  0.3672  –0.0013  0.8774  –0.0121  0.1288  –0.0137  0.1745 
% A shares –0.0635  0.0106  –0.0084  0.7163  –0.0068  0.7525  –0.0114  0.5563  –0.0329  0.1180 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0169  0.0238  –0.0131  0.0623  –0.0160  0.0565  –0.0184  0.0138  –0.0169  0.0465 
Firm size –0.0026  0.2694  0.0029  0.2138  0.0037  0.1958  0.0078  0.0014  0.0045  0.0922 
Leverage –0.0884 0.0000 –0.0948 0.0000 –0.0808 0.0000 –0.0615 0.0000  –0.0276 0.0611 
Financial debt/total debt –0.0297  0.0022  –0.0204  0.0269  –0.0171  0.1119  –0.0073  0.4676  –0.0307  0.0103 
Short-term debt/total debt 0.0144  0.2400  0.0108  0.3815  0.0017  0.9049  0.0170  0.2172  0.0031  0.8497 
Fixed assets/total assets 0.0207  0.1181  0.0173  0.1696  0.0189  0.1845  0.0337  0.0126  0.0111  0.4853 
Cash & securities/total assets 0.0003  0.9883  0.0290  0.1130  0.0676  0.0039  0.0635  0.0013  0.0753  0.0023 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.0115  0.1736  0.0145  0.0777  0.0069  0.5075  0.0165  0.0636  0.0089  0.4270 
Real GDP growth rate –0.0109  0.9671  0.0026  0.9896  –0.0931  0.6661  0.5742  0.0012  0.5539  0.1884 
Adjusted R-square 0.2470 0.3020 0.2610 0.3128 0.1682
Number of observations 343 303 239 215 1806
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel B: Determinants of change in ROA
Intercept –0.0506 0.1552  0.0209 0.5893  0.0203 0.6632  0.0196 0.6129  0.1134 0.1084 
Ch. % government shares 0.0033  0.7788  0.0212  0.0558  –0.0041  0.7769  0.0581  0.0039  –0.0431  0.2081 
Ch. % A shares –0.0652  0.1421  –0.1438  0.0159  –0.0088  0.7156  –0.0156  0.7835  –0.0694  0.2559 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0061  0.2173  0.0023  0.6762  0.0012  0.8430  0.0037  0.4271  0.0089  0.2229 
Firm size 0.0022  0.1772  –0.0009  0.6128  –0.0012  0.5906  –0.0015  0.3976  –0.0041  0.1356 
Ch. leverage –0.0637  0.0001  –0.0419  0.0175  –0.0765  0.0001  –0.0300  0.0609  –0.1184  0.0000 
Ch. financial debt/total debt –0.0101  0.2649  –0.0167  0.1034  –0.0300  0.0179  –0.0295  0.0058  –0.0244  0.1657 
Ch. short-term debt/total debt –0.0047  0.6748  –0.0006  0.9660  0.0414  0.0209  –0.0107  0.4298  –0.0205  0.3630 
Ch. fixed assets/total assets –0.0293  0.1113  –0.0122  0.5421  –0.0259  0.3210  0.0379  0.0362  –0.0426  0.1989 
Ch. cash & securities/total assets –0.0471  0.0063  –0.0033  0.8671  –0.0464  0.0477  0.0554  0.0010  0.0211  0.5148 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.0022  0.7237  –0.0005  0.9410  0.0022  0.8008  0.0145  0.0303  –0.0120  0.2924 
Real GDP growth rate 0.0550  0.7822  –0.1970  0.2815  –0.0265  0.8881  0.0442  0.7398  –0.4732  0.3376 
Adjusted R-square 0.0492 0.0413 0.1450 0.1218 0.1526




Regression results for ROE
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel A: Determinants of ROE
Intercept 0.2232 0.0499  0.0069 0.9479 –0.0712 0.5387 –0.0055 0.9683  –0.0647 0.7016 
% government shares –0.0080  0.6452  0.0141  0.3382  0.0000  0.9979  0.0139  0.4560  –0.0083  0.7387 
% A shares –0.1050  0.0328  –0.0126  0.7791  –0.0136  0.7291  –0.0149  0.7447  –0.0338  0.5142 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0266  0.0725  –0.0277  0.0430  –0.0331  0.0308  –0.0292  0.0952  –0.0298  0.1542 
Firm size –0.0062  0.1853  0.0042  0.3579  0.0077  0.1412  –0.0027  0.6360  0.0013  0.8378 
Leverage 0.0245 0.3834 –0.0309 0.2422 –0.0194 0.4679  0.0821 0.0047  0.1360 0.0002 
Financial debt/total debt –0.0421  0.0279  –0.0356  0.0476  –0.0203  0.3037  –0.0240  0.3119  –0.0703  0.0171 
Short-term debt/total debt 0.0335  0.1676  0.0116  0.6300  0.0071  0.7791  0.0396  0.2218  0.0317  0.4323 
Fixed assets/total assets 0.0402  0.1255  0.0304  0.2138  0.0238  0.3623  0.0646  0.0420  0.0290  0.4603 
Cash & securities/total assets 0.0089  0.8061  0.0477  0.1794  0.1115  0.0091  0.0868  0.0592  0.1081  0.0735 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.0327  0.0517  0.0294  0.0656  0.0106  0.5799  0.0282  0.1758  0.0175  0.5244 
Real GDP growth rate 0.1820  0.7296  –0.0847  0.8283  –0.2370  0.5486  0.6296  0.1261  0.6930  0.5038 
Adjusted R-square 0.0344 0.0687 0.0591 0.0463 0.0678
Number of observations 343 303 239 215 1806
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value estimate p-value
Panel B: Determinants of change in ROE
Intercept –0.0575 0.4097  0.0562 0.4737  0.0676 0.4558  0.4244 0.0004  0.1858 0.1975 
Ch. % government shares –0.0021  0.9276  0.0309  0.1667  –0.0046  0.8714  0.0986  0.1044  –0.1005  0.1511 
Ch. % A shares –0.0930  0.2849  –0.3136  0.0094  –0.0207  0.6578  0.0319  0.8530  –0.0770  0.5365 
Dummy for foreign owner –0.0094  0.3308  –0.0002  0.9880  0.0062  0.6048  0.0083  0.5620  0.0125  0.4004 
Firm size 0.0023  0.4578  –0.0030  0.4074  –0.0034  0.4284  –0.0188  0.0005  –0.0063  0.2692 
Ch. leverage 0.0553  0.0825  0.0981  0.0061  0.0202  0.5987  0.0840  0.0836  0.0346  0.5325 
Ch. financial debt/total debt –0.0119  0.5013  –0.0211  0.3095  –0.0432  0.0791  –0.0303  0.3454  –0.0640  0.0755 
Ch. short-term debt/total debt –0.0104  0.6357  –0.0063  0.8269  0.0985  0.0049  –0.0036  0.9309  –0.0492  0.2843 
Ch. fixed assets/total assets –0.0388  0.2816  –0.0040  0.9207  –0.0385  0.4486  0.1645  0.0029  –0.0742  0.2735 
Ch. cash & securities/total assets –0.0651  0.0534  0.0033  0.9325  –0.0783  0.0853  0.1081  0.0337  0.0623  0.3462 
Dummy for regulated industry 0.0100  0.4025  –0.0088  0.5466  –0.0088  0.6020  0.0260  0.2001  –0.0197  0.3975 
Real GDP growth rate 0.0746  0.8482  –0.2017  0.5854  –0.1240  0.7346  –0.5456  0.1780  –0.9509  0.3458 
Adjusted R-square 0.0036 0.0387 0.0462 0.1035 0.0082
Number of observations 335 302 238 211 177cial debt/total debt, shortdebt is short-term debt/total debt, fixassets is
fixed assets/total assets, cash is cash & marketable securities/total
assets, regulated is a dummy for regulated industries such as utilities,
and GDP is the real GDP growth rate. Including the real GDP growth
rate should allow us to control for privatization timing, so that we do
not confuse performance improvements with favorable economic con-
ditions. Previous studies usually had only a limited scope of control
variables for firm-specific factors, which, to some extent, might have
concealed the real forces behind any performance changes. A∆ in one
of the above variables indicates a change in this variable.
As far as the impact of different types of ownership on ROS is con-
cerned, the percentage of government ownership cannot explain per-
formance differences across firms since the coefficient of this vari-
able is not significantly different from zero in each post-privatization
year. Surprisingly, the regressions explaining changes in ROS indi-
cate that a large decrease in government ownership as of privatization
negatively affects performance, especially in the early years after the
event. When we replace state ownership by institutional (legal per-
sons) ownership, we find that the latter variable is not related to
absolute performance, but that large increases in institutional owner-
ship as of privatization negatively affect ROS in years 1 and 2, but
positively affect ROS in year 5.
These results thus suggest that a large decrease in state ownership at
privatization is not beneficial to a firm, but may pay in the longer run.
The percentage of Ashares does not affect ROS and changes in this per-
centage are not related to changes in ROS. However, we do find that
retail ownership is significantly negatively related to ROA and ROE in
the first year and that changes in this variable are significantly nega-
tively related to the changes in ROA, respectively ROE in year 2 after
privatization, which support our earlier conclusion. Finally, the coeffi-
cient of the foreign ownership dummy variable is negative and signifi-
cant in years 2, 3 and 4; this variable does not explain changes in ROS,
however. Overall, our results deviate from the earlier literature on
Chinese privatizations, which has generally confirmed that state share-
holdings have a detrimental effect on financial performance whereas
institutional investors are beneficial. These differences may be due to our
study focusing on more recent, partial privatizations and examining
performance changes over different post-privatization years. Also, the
positive relation between changes in government ownership and changes
in ROS in the early post-privatization years may be caused by the
682decision of the government to divest shares in firms with limited
profitability prospects, which calls for future research on this topic.
As for the firm-specific factors, we find that larger firms generally
show better ROS figures, especially in the later years. Firm size, how-
ever, does not bear any relation with performance changes. We find
strong evidence that firms with a high debt ratio show relatively low
ROS. Also, the relation between the change in leverage and the change
in ROS is negative and significantly so in most of the years. Next, the
percentage of financial debt is not related to ROS, while it negatively
impacts ROA and ROE in most years. The same conclusions hold for
the regressions that explain performance changes. Interestingly, the
percentage of short-term debt has a significantly negative impact on
ROS during each year, except for year 5. Further research is needed
to examine the causality behind these relations. Finally, we find evi-
dence that capital intensity does not affect performance whereas firms
with high cash holdings show somewhat better performance. Specifi-
cally, the percentage of cash is positively related to ROS in all years
and significantly so in years 3 and 4. Similar conclusions hold when
examining the relation between changes in cash and changes in ROS.
Our earlier remark on causality also holds in this case.
Firms in regulated industries show better ROS figures; this indus-
try feature however only explains absolute performance as it is not
significantly related to changes in ROS. While it is useful to control
for the variation in economic conditions, the real GDP growth rate
generally is not significant in explaining post-privatization perfor-
mance, even though this variable has the expected positive sign.
Overall, our results show that it is much easier to explain absolute
performance rather than performance changes using the explanatory
variables in our model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Studies on privatization in developed and developing countries so far
have answered important questions, such as why to privatize and how
to privatize. Also, there is a huge literature on the post-privatization
performance of newly privatized firms.
In practice, the objectives of launching a privatization program
usually include raising revenues for the state, promoting wider share
ownership, reducing the government’s interference in the economy,
683stimulating economic efficiency and introducing competition to subject
SOEs to market discipline. From a theoretical point of view,
privatization can mitigate agency problems of equity when the real
owners of the SOE’s assets are unable to write complete contracts with
the firm or monitor it. Also, privatization can promote efficiency when
the privatized firm is subject to market competition and hardened bud-
get constraints. Finally, the entry of private ownership may reduce or
deter costly government interventions. However, partial privatizations
where the government keeps a stake in its SOEs might be beneficial
as well. In countries where the markets for managerial labor and cor-
porate control are not well developed, the government may be more
efficient in monitoring the firm than other (small) investors. Also, the
government stake can serve as a signal that it will not arbitrarily change
its policies in the future. In the case of China, it turns out that partial
privatizations are quite important and that the government retains a
large stake in most firms, even up to five years after privatization.
The most frequently used privatization method is to sell state
property via a SIP or through a direct asset sale. Specific privatization
terms in SIPs, such as the percentage of shares divested, underpricing
and share allocation, are interrelated decisions that are largely deter-
mined by the government’s priorities in achieving various economic
and political objectives. Unfortunately, no study has yet examined the
Chinese government’s choice between a SIP and a direct asset sale
and the determinants of specific SIP-terms, except for underpricing.
Studies on SIPs (and IPOs) in China have revealed that underpricing
is largely determined by institutional factors, such as the fairly long
time period between offering and listing, the CSRC control on the
number of shares that can be listed and the geographic distribution of
share issue quotas by CSRC.
Next, empirical studies on the performance of newly privatized
firms generally indicate that privatization has a positive impact on the
operating and financial performance of state-owned enterprises world-
wide. China, however, is an exception, which usually is attributed to
the fact that most privatizations are partial ones. After implementing
a preliminary descriptive analysis as well as a multivariate analysis on
a sample of 429 non-financial firms that experience partial privatiza-
tion over the period 1994-2002, we do not find evidence that govern-
ment ownership has a significant impact on post-privatization perfor-
mance. By contrast, we find that large reductions in the percentage of
shares owned by the state negatively impact performance during the
684first few years after privatization; these results tend to reverse in the
later years. Other types of shareholders, such as retail and foreign
investors, play a negative – if any – role. As a result, we believe that
exploring the determinants of underperformance in Chinese privatized
companies is more complicated than simply deciding whether gov-
ernment ownership is good or not. One reason is that little is known
about the underlying forces that determine the divestment of shares by
the government in Chinese SOEs. A study on the unique and gradual
reform of SOEs in China therefore may be able to provide new and
fresh perspectives for the literature on privatization as well as the lit-
erature on corporate governance.
NOTES
1. These policies will be discussed in Section IV.C of this paper.
2. For listed companies on the Shanghai stock exchange, the average debt ratio of most
former SOEs still exceeds 50% in 2002 (own calculations). Also, according to esti-
mates of Standard and Poor’s and official statements by the Chinese government, bad
loans account for more than 20% of outstanding bank loans at the four largest state-
owned banks by the end of 2003.
3. More details on the privatization of small SOEs can be found in Cao et al. (1999). By
1996, about 70% of small SOEs have been privatized in the provinces that first initi-
ated a privatization program whereas more than 50% have been privatized in many
other provinces.
4. Although the state shareholder and the other shareholders enjoy the same rights
according to Chinese law, the state shareholder sometimes can choose between a cash
dividend and a stock dividend whereas the other shareholders have to content
themselves with stock dividends.
5. Domestic institutions include holding companies, non-bank financial institutions, and
SOEs that have at least one non-state owner (Xu and Wang (1997)). Legal persons can
divest their stake by transferring it to other companies through a private negotiation.
6. It is required that A shares account for at least 25% of total outstanding shares when
a company goes public.
7. Since 2002, the Chinese government has started to collect information on feasible
plans that could make state shares tradable. The expectation that a huge number of state
shares may circulate in the future has sent share prices on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
stock exchanges to a historical low since then.
8. Chen et al. (2001) analyze this phenomenon in more detail using panel data on
68 firms that have both A and B shares outstanding over the period 1992-1997. They
conclude that the price discount is mainly due to the illiquidity of the B shares. As a
result, foreign investors require a higher return in order to be compensated for the
lower liquidity and the higher transaction costs on the B-share market.
9. The restrictions on foreign capital have been loosened since 2002, but as described in
Section IV.C, the government is still selective about industries into which foreign
investors are allowed to enter.
10. Foreign investors are regarded as politically less important in the sense that these
investors usually are not the group the government targets to obtain political support
for the privatization.
68511. Also, A and B shares usually are issued at different prices.
12. In their sample, this period averages to 238 days for A-share IPOs and 20 days for
B-share IPOs.
13. Boubakri and Cosset use crude accounting performance measures and measures
adjusted for market effects and the possibility of a pre-privatization debt restructuring.
14. The sum of the squared percentage of shares held by each of the top-10 shareholders.
15. Sun and Tong (2003) argue that because of the change in Chinese accounting prac-
tices in 1993, there is a problem of incomparability when examining accounting mea-
sures on a sample that includes firms before and after 1993.
16. Since the corporate bond market is almost non-existent in China, bank loans are the
most viable source of debt financing for most firms.
17. We indeed find that the explanatory power of the model examining ROS is much
higher than that explaining ROA and ROE. However, we find that our general con-
clusions from examining ROS also largely extend to the other performance measures.
18. The correlation between government and institutional ownership was as high as -0.89;
therefore both variables could not be included in the same model. We find that pair-
wise correlations among other explanatory variables never exceed 0.6. So multi-
collinearity is unlikely to be a problem in our study.
REFERENCES
Berglof, E. and Roland, G., 1998, Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition
Economies, Journal of Comparative Economics 26, 1, 18-40.
Bolton, P., 1995, Privatization and the Separation of Ownership and Control: Lessons from
Chinese Enterprise Reform, Economics of Transition 3, 1, 1-11.
Bortolotti, B., Fantini, M. and Scarpa, C., 2000, Why do Governments Sell Privatised
Companies Abroad?, Working paper, (Fondazione ENI-Enrico Mattei, FEEM, Milan).
Boubakri, N. and Cosset, J.C., 1998, The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly
Privatized Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries, Journal of Finance 53, 3, 1081-
1110.
Brada, J.C., 1996, Privatization is Transition – Or is it? Journal of Economic Perspectives
10, 2, 67-86.
Byrd, W. and Lin, Q., 1990, China’s Rural Industry: Structure, Development and Reform,
(New York, Oxford University Press).
Chan, K., Wang, J. and Wei, K.C.J., 2004, Underpricing and Long-Term Performance of
IPOs in China, Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 3, 409-430.
Cao, Y., Qian, Y. and Weingast, B.R., 1999, From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatiza-
tion, Chinese Style, Economics of Transition 7, 1, 103-131.
Che, J., 2002, Rent Seeking and Government Ownership of Firms: an Application to China’s
Township-Village Enterprises, Journal of Comparative Economics 30, 4, 787-811.
Chen, G., Firth, M. and Rui, O., 2002, Have China’s Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved
Efficiency and Profitability?, working paper, (Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong
Kong).
Chen, G., Lee, B.S. and Rui, O., 2001, Foreign Ownership Restrictions and Market Seg-
mentation in China’s Stock Markets, Journal of Financial Research 24, 1, 133-155.
Dewenter, K. and Malatesta, P.H., 1997, Public Offerings of State-Owned and Privately-
Owned Enterprises: an International Comparison, Journal of Finance 52, 4, 1659-1679.
Frydman, R., Gray, C.W., Hessel, M. and Rapaczynski, A., 2000, The Limits of Disci-
pline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies, Econom-
ics of Transition 8, 3,577-601.
Gao, S. and Shaffer, M.E., 1998, Financial Discipline in the Enterprise Sector in Transition
Countries: How Does China Compare?, Discussion paper, (Hariot-Watt University, UK).
686Grossman, S. and Hart, O., 1980, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory
of the Corporation, Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42-64.
Jenkinson, T. and Ljungqvist, A., 2001, Going Public: the Theory and Evidence on how
Companies Raise Equity Finance, (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-306.
Jones, S.L., Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C. and Netter, J.M., 1999, Share Issue Privatiza-
tions as Financial Means to Political and Economic Ends, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 53, 2, 217-253.
Li, W., 1997, The Impact of Economic Reform on the Performance of Chinese State Enter-
prises, 1980-1989, Journal of Political Economy 105, 5, 1080-1106.
Lin, C., 2000, Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China’s Economic Transi-
tion, Working paper, (University of Oxford, Oxford).
Liu, W. and Gao, M., 1999, Studies on China’s Economic Development, (Shanghai Far East
Press, Shanghai).
Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C., Netter, J.M. and Poulsen, A., 2000, The Choice between Pri-
vate and Public Markets: Evidence from Privatizations, working paper, (University of
Georgia).
Megginson, W.L., Nash, R.C. and Van Randenborgh, M., 1994, The Financial and Oper-
ating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: an International Empirical Analysis, Jour-
nal of Finance 49, 2, 403-452.
Megginson, W.L. and Netter, J.M., 2001, From State to Market: a Survey of Empirical
Studies on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39, 2, 321-389.
Mok, H.M.K. and Hui, Y.V., 1998, Underpricing and the Aftermarket Performance of IPOs
in Shanghai, China, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 6, 5, 453-474.
Perotti, E., 1995, Credible Privatization, American Economic Review 85, 847-859.
Price Waterhouse, 1989, Privatization: Learning the Lessons from the U.K. Experience,
(London, Price Waterhouse).
Pryke, R., 1982, The Comparative Performance of Private and Public Enterprises, Fiscal
Studies 3, 3, 68-81.
Qi, D., Wu, W. and Zhang, H., 2000, Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance
of Partially Privatized Firms: Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies, Pacific-Basin
Finance Journal 8, 5, 587-610.
Sappington, D.E.M. and Stiglitz, J.E., 1987, Privatization, Information and Incentives,
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6, 4, 567-582.
Shleifer, A., 1998, State versus Private Ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12,
4, 133-150.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of
Finance 52, 2, 737-783.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal
of Political Economy 94, 3, 461-488.
Sun, Q. and Tong, W.H.S., 2003, “China Share Issue Privatization: The Extent of its Suc-
cess, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 2, 183-222.
Tian, L., 2001, “Government Shareholding and the Value of China’s Modern Firms, Work-
ing paper, (William Davidson).
Wu, X., 1997, Research Report on Debt Restructuring of China’s State Sector, (China
Financial Press, Bejing).
Xu, X. and Wang, Y., 1997, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firms’ Per-
formance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies, Working paper, (World Bank, Wash-
ington D.C.).
Yarrow, G., 1986, Privatization in Theory and Practice, Economic policy 2, 324-364.
687